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  1Résumé 
 
Cet article propose d’évaluer la sensibilité de la rentabilité bancaire aux chocs 
macroéconomiques sévères mais plausibles. En particulier, à partir de données de superviseur 
couvrant la période 1993-2009, nous testons la résistance des banques françaises. D’abord, nous 
identifions les déterminants macroéconomiques et financiers (croissance du PIB, courbe des taux, 
volatilité du marché boursier) et les déterminants individuels (total du bilan, ratio des fonds 
propres et revenus hors intérêts par rapport au total bilan) de la rentabilité des banques. Ensuite, 
dans le cadre des exercices de macro-stress tests, nous montrons que la rentabilité des banques 
françaises est peu affectée par les scenarios macroéconomiques adverses.  Ainsi, selon notre 
modèle, le système bancaire français dans son ensemble resterait rentable même dans un scénario 
de récession sévère.  
 
Mots-clés: rentabilité bancaire, estimation dynamique de panel, stress test 
 




We build a stress testing framework to evaluate the sensitivity of banks’ profitability to plausible 
but severe adverse macroeconomic shocks. Specifically, we test the resilience of French banks 
using supervisory data over the period 1993-2009. First, we identify the macroeconomic and 
financial variables (GDP growth, interest rate maturity spread, stock market’s volatility) and 
bank-specific variables (size, capital ratio, ratio of non interest income to assets) that significantly 
affect French banks’ profitability. Second, our macroeconomic stress testing exercises based on a 
simulation of macroeconomic variables show that French banks’ profitability is resilient to major 
adverse macroeconomic scenarios. Specifically, our findings highlight that even severe 
recessions would leave the French banking system profitable. 
 
Keywords: bank profitability, dynamic panel estimation, stress test. 
 
JEL classification: C23; G21; L2.
  21. Introduction 
 
Over the last decades, banking systems of developed countries have experienced major changes 
regarding their sources of revenue. The traditional interest revenue has been increasingly replaced 
by fees & commissions and trading incomes. According to some observers, this development 
could lead to a weaker resilience of banks’ revenues to adverse shocks. Yet, several banking 
systems, among which the French one, went through the current financial crisis without any 
failure and their profitability remained strong in spite of a strong economic and financial 
downturn. As a matter of fact, the French banking system as a whole proved profitable even 
through 2008 and 2009.  
 
From the supervisory point of view that aims to ensure the banking system’s solvency, 
identifying the vulnerabilities of banks’ profitability is crucial. First, profits prove to be a, if not 
the main, driver of bank capital (Gropp and Heider, 2009). Hence, any trouble regarding banks' 
profitability is likely to be transmitted to the solvency ratios, eventually threatening the banking 
system’s strength. Second, in line with the “bank capital channel” literature (van den Heuvel, 
2002), banks facing a slump in profits, together with difficulties to issue additional equity, are 
likely to ration credit in order to meet regulatory constraints, and finally to weigh on the 
economic growth. Third, profits are known to be reliable early-warning indicators of financial 
distress (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1999), though they are available, at best, at a, 
quarterly frequency. This low profitability data frequency, in addition to their backward-looking 
nature, makes it fundamental for regulators to identify the main determinants of profits in order to 
run accurate forecasts and make out vulnerabilities in a more forward-looking manner.  
 
The early research dedicated to banks’ earnings sources focuses on net interest margins (Ho and 
Saunders, 1981). In that respect, Allen (1988), Saunders and Schumacher (2000), and Demirgürc-
Kunt and Huizinga (2000) highlight a robust relationship between interest margins and the 
business cycle.  
 
Nevertheless, the growing importance of non-interest income (fees & commissions and trading 
incomes) progressively lessens the importance of net interest income. On average the share of 
  3income generated by traditional interest activities has progressively fallen in the US and in 
Europe over the two last decades. Therefore, recent research has focused on the determinants of 
bank profitability accounting for both interest and non-interest activities. Alternatively, the 
literature on bank interest margins has considered the impact of non-interest activities on optimal 
loan price and margin setting (Carbo Valverde and Rodriguez Fernandez, 2007). In this paper, 
because we are concerned about the safety and soundness of the banking system and the ability of 
individual banks to generate income to prevent sharp equity changes, we focus on aggregate 
profit measures such as the return on equity (ROE) and the return on assets (ROA). Earlier work 
on bank profitability has focused on three types of determinants which are generally found as 
significant determinants of banks’ profitability: firm-specific variables (the amount of capital, 
bank expenditures, the size of the bank proxied by its total assets, and the risk born by the 
financial institution) as stated by Goddard et al. (2004), Kosmidou et al. (2006), Athanasoglou et 
al. (2008), and Albertazzi and Gambacorta (2009); variables linked to the market’s structure (the 
market power of the bank, the share of non-interest income), as established by Smirlock (1985), 
Berger (1995), Lepetit et al. (2008); and finally macroeconomic and financial variables (GDP 
growth, interest rate spread, inflation, stock market’s return and volatility, loan growth), as 
established, among others, by Revell (1979), Molyneux and Thornton (1992), Demirguc-Kunt 
and Huizinga (2000), Beckmann (2007), Athanasoglou et al. (2008), and Albertazzi and 
Gambacorta (2009). 
 
In order to assess the resilience of financial institutions to macroeconomic and financial shocks, 
we rely on the recent stress testing frameworks developed by supervisors and central banks over 
recent years. In contrast to the methods implemented by banks themselves, those implemented by 
supervisors focus on the resilience of the financial system as a whole. Jones et al. (2004), Sorge 
(2004) and Foglia (2009), among others, provide extensive literature reviews on those practices. 
The purpose of such methodologies is to test the capability of the financial system to survive 
severe but plausible scenarios. Hence, they appear as particularly relevant tools to assess the 
effects of adverse scenarios on banks’ profitability, like our paper’s objective, since they prove 
forward-looking and adapted to various unfavorable hypothetical scenarios. 
 
In the present paper, we propose a framework to evaluate the resilience of banks’ revenues to 
adverse macroeconomic shocks, and apply it to French supervisory data. For this purpose, we 
  4first identify the main determinants of French banks’ profitability – measured by their Return-on-
Assets – by considering the most relevant macro and bank-specific factors used in the literature. 
Second, we develop an innovative stress testing framework to evaluate the resistance of French 
banks’ Return-on-Assets to adverse macroeconomic shocks.  
 
Our contribution to the existing literature is twofold. First, we build up an original and 
comprehensive (i.e. not restricted to sensitivity analysis) macro-econometric stress testing 
framework that allows us to test for the resilience of banking profitability in the current downturn 
context. Second, although Goyeau et al. (1998) and Goyeau et al. (2002) extend the model 
developed by Flannery (1981) to analyze the profitability of French banks their focus is on the 
sensitivity of bank profits to interest rate changes. To our knowledge, our paper is the first one 
that uses individual supervisory bank data to study the determinants of French banks’ profits and 
their sensitivity to changes in the economic environment as a whole and therefore accounting for 
a large number of macro variables such as interest rates but also GDP growth, inflation, stock 
prices and exchange rates.   
 
Our results show that banks’ profitability significantly depends on macroeconomic and financial 
variables (GDP growth, interest rate spread, stock market’s volatility) and bank-specific variables 
(size, capital ratio, ratio of non interest income to assets). However, simulating major 
macroeconomic shocks and looking at the magnitude of their effect on banks’ profitability, we 
find that French banks’ profitability is resilient to major adverse macroeconomic scenarios. These 
outcomes are likely to give quantitative grounds to the fact that, at the current juncture, one did 
not observe any disastrous loss among the French banking system. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the data and the model 
we estimate as a first step to capture the determinants of bank profitability. Section 3 presents our 
main findings as well as robustness checks for this first stage procedure. Section 4 describes the 
stress testing framework and the subsequent results; section 5 concludes.       
 
 
2. Data and empirical model 
  5 
2.1 Data 
 
In this paper, bank-specific variables come from the supervisory dataset BAFi consisting of a 
panel of individual French banks’ consolidated data, on a relatively long period (1993-2009) on 
an annual basis. The dataset, called ‘BAFi’ which stands for ‘Base des Agents Financiers’ (Basis 
of financial agents), belong to the French banking supervisor (‘Prudential Supervisory 
Authority’). Relying on such supervisory data allows us considering the whole French banking 
system on a consolidated basis in a comprehensive way. In particular, it turns out that the quality 
of data as regards non-interest and especially trading income appears much better than that of 
private data providers, especially at the very beginning of the sample. The panel is unbalanced, 
that is to say, some banks may appear or disappear from time to time, essentially because of 
mergers and acquisitions. Hence, we finally get an overall number of 370 different groups over 
the whole sample, about 170 on average each year.  
 
2.2 Dependent variable 
 
Our dependent variable is banks’ profits. Alternative profitability measures could be considered 
for the purpose of this study, Return-on-Assets (ROA), defined as the ratio of the net income 
after taxes to total assets and Return-on-equity (ROE), defined as the ratio of the net income after 
taxes to total equity. Net Interest Margin, defined as the ratio of the net interest income after taxes 
to total assets could also be used as a proxy. However as net interest margin is solely based on 
interest activities, whose importance in terms of share of total income has experienced a 
continuous decrease over the recent years (Coffinet et al., 2009) and does not constitute an 
aggregate measure of profitability, we do not consider it as a relevant endogenous variable for the 
purpose of this paper.  
 
As regards ROE and ROA, the latter is more consistent with supervisory concerns than the 
former: first, it is directly related to the quality of loans, as opposed to ROE, which takes on the 
shareholder’s perspective; second, ROA may be computed as the ratio of ROE to leverage, and 
thus integrates the latter explicitly, which is of special interest at the current juncture. However, 
there might be to some extent inconsistencies between the numerator and the denominator of the 
  6ROA because the former is related to profits generated from all activities and the latter covers 
only the balance-sheet activities. Nevertheless, ROA reflects the ability of banks to generate 
profits from all activities related to their assets. It seems particularly relevant for banks with 
noteworthy intermediation activities, and especially most French banks. Hence, we focus on 
ROA as the key ratio for evaluating banks’ profitability, consistently with our supervisory 
objective and following the recommendations of the International Monetary Fund (2002) and 
numerous studies like, for instance, Athanasoglou et al. (2008). 
 
Chart 1 displays the evolution of banks’ profitability during the period under consideration 
according to these three measures after removing outliers, defined as observations beyond the 
95% percentile and below the 5% percentile.  
 
[Chart 1: evolution of banks’ profitability (1993-2009)] 
 
From the outset, one notices that the overall French banking system’s Return-on-Assets seems to 
move in accordance with the business cycle, with significant decreases in the years 1993-1994, 
2001-2002 and 2007-2009, coincident with economic slowdowns or downturns. On the contrary, 
the periods from 1994 to 2000, and 2003 to 2006, corresponding to robust economic growth, 
exhibit an increase in the French banking system’s Return-on-Assets.  
 
Besides, chart 1 shows that ROA and ROE behave in a very similar manner over the whole 
sample period. The correlation between both series is very high (93%). Hence, we can infer from 
that figure that results obtained on the basis of ROA figures are robust to the choice of the 
profitability measure (ROA vs. ROE). On the contrary, as expected, NIM is less correlated to 
ROA and ROE, and behaves in an opposite manner (as shown by the negative sign of the 
correlation coefficients). This tends to show that the aggregate profitability of banks is, over the 
sample period, rather linked to non-intermediation activities than to traditional interest revenues.  
 
Nonetheless, the French banking system is composed of institutions with different legal status, 
that is to say commercial banks, financial and investment firms, and mutual and cooperative 
banks. The sample (cf. Table 1) seems well balanced between different types of institutions with, 
for a total of 2896 bank-year observations,  920 for commercial banks, 1070 for mutual and 
  7cooperative banks and 906 for financial and investment firms. The average ROA for the whole 
French banking system reaches 0.67%. It is homogenous across the three groups and ranges from 
0.55% for commercial banks to 0.88% for financial and investment firms. Its standard deviation 
for financial and investment firms is more than two times higher than that of mutual and 
cooperative banks, indicating a higher heterogeneity in the former group than in the latter. 
Moreover, consistently with the empirical literature, we find that smaller banks generate higher 
ROA and in accordance with the too-big-to-fail hypothesis, that they are also more capitalized. 
 
[Table 1: descriptive statistics of individual bank variables] 
 
2.3 Independent variables 
 
As regards the bank-specific determinants of banks’ profitability, the related literature generally 
considers the amount of capital, the size of the bank, the risk born by the bank and the 
expenditures amount of the bank (Goddard et al., 2004; Kosmidou et al., 2006; Athanasoglou et 
al., 2008; Albertazzi and Gambacorta, 2009). The amount of capital is likely to positively impact 
profitability, as capital may be interpreted as the amount of own funds available to support the 
bank’s business, and hence as a buffer against adverse developments. This relationship may be 
strengthened by the M&As that occurred in the late 90s. Finally, a high capital ratio may be 
viewed as a means for a bank to signal a high expected profitability. The size of the bank is a 
possible determinant of its profitability, as size can be considered as a proxy for capital adequacy 
since large banks raise capital at a lower cost. Nevertheless, the empirical evidence is mixed and 
sometimes points out a significantly negative relationship between size and profitability. An 
interpretation is that large banks could experiment negative effects due to bureaucratic reasons. 
Conversely, too-big-too-fail considerations may lead to a positive relationship. The risk born by 
the bank could act in the following way: an increase in exposure to credit risk would decrease 
bank’s profitability. The risk proxy mostly used in the literature is the ratio of loan-loss 
provisions to total loans and is specific to credit risk which might not be relevant in the context of 
a growing share of non-interest income in total income. The relationship is in the literature 
generally unambiguously negative though sometimes not significant. The expenditures ratio of 
the banks (i.e. operating cost over assets) is expected to be negatively related to profitability, as 
improved management of those expenses may increase efficiency and raise profits. The market 
  8power assumption suggests that firms with large market shares and differentiated products are 
able to use market power and enjoy a more secured income position. Another possible source of 
profitability is linked to the source of revenues: all other things kept equal, a higher share of 
revenue stemming from a more profitable business is likely to act positively on the overall profit. 
In that respect, the increase in non-interest income could have a positive effect on banks’ 
profitability. Hence, in this paper, we also control for business differences. 
 
All in all, we consider the following bank-specific variables: 
-  The ‘capital’ variable is defined, for each bank, as the ratio of equity to total assets; 
-  The ratio of non-interest income ‘nnii’ is the ratio of the sum of fees and commissions, trading 
income and dividends to total assets4; 
-  The ‘expenditures’ ratio is defined as the ratio of total expenditures to total assets; 
-  The size of the bank variable is built as dummy variables: ‘Large’ for banks whose balance-sheet 
amount is in the upper quartile and ‘Small’ for those whose balance-sheet is in lower quartile; 
-  The ‘risk’ variable is the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans; 
-  The ‘market power’ variable is the individual net operating income over the total net operating 
income of the banking industry. 
 
The macroeconomic and financial determinants reflect the economic and financial environment 
which can also affect banks’ performances. They are the same across banks and hence represent 
as many cross-sectional common factors. Six macroeconomic and financial variables are often 
considered: economic growth, inflation, interest rate spread (split or not between short-term and 
long-term), stock index return and volatility, and loan growth. There are several reasons why 
output growth may have a positive impact of bank profitability. First, higher growth may result in 
a higher loan distribution (increased demand) and indirectly higher revenues from financial 
markets, due to higher stock market returns. Second, with expectations of higher profits, 
provisions could decrease in economic upturns and hence capital may have a positive impact on 
profitability. Empirically, many studies find a significantly positive relationship between GDP 
growth and banking profitability. However, the effect of inflation on profitability is ambiguous 
                                                      
4 Alternative measures could be the ratio of non-interest income to total income or the ratio of net non-interest income to total net 
operating income (DeYoung and Roland, 2001; Stiroh, 2004; Stiroh and Rumble, 2006; Lepetit et al., 2008). However, these 
measures do not lead to robust results in the outcomes of our regressions, or make the other variables’ significance less robust. 
Hence, we decided to rely on that ‘nnii’ measure, yielding very robust specifications of the model, and already used by Smith et 
al. (2003) and DeYoung and Rice (2004).   
  9and essentially depends on whether bank’s expenses grow faster than inflation i.e. whether 
inflation is accurately forecasted by the banks or not. A significantly positive effect of inflation of 
profitability is generally interpreted as a good monitoring of future inflation by banks, yielding an 
accurate adjustment of interest rates and thus resulting in revenues growing faster than costs. In 
most recent papers, the effect of inflation on profitability is found significantly positive. The 
effect of interest rate spread relies on the traditional maturity transformation activity of banks, 
yielding revenues essentially related to loans: banks are assumed to receive and remunerate short-
term deposits and grant long-term loans, from which they receive an interest rate. Hence, a higher 
interest rate spread is likely to impact positively on banking profitability. This effect is to be 
more significant when tested on the NIM subcomponent of revenues. Loan growth is linked to 
the traditional source of revenue for the banks that is the one stemming from credit distribution. 
Among the different revenue sources, it is likely to impact positively not only on net interest 
income, but also on a part of fees related to credit. Stock market returns are directly linked to the 
revenue’s subcomponent stemming from trading income. However, it often appears strongly 
correlated with GDP growth, which makes its study as a determinant of the overall banking 
profitability difficult, all the more than GDP growth is jointly considered. On the contrary, stock 
market volatility, which may increase banks’ trading opportunities, yields higher non interest 
income and profitability, or increase provisions because of higher uncertainty and thus leads to 
smaller profits.  
 
We use the following explanatory variables for our regressions on ROA: 
-  ‘GDP growth’ is defined as the year-on-year change in the real French GDP in volume, extracted 
from the OECD database. The choice of the national GDP growth is consistent with the choices 
made by Athanasoglou et al. (2008) and Albertazzi and Gambacorta (2009) among others. It 
assumes that, even on a consolidated database, profitability of French banks essentially depends 
on the French growth, irrespective of those of countries where international groups may own 
assets. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable, first as French GDP growth does not prove, on average, 
uncorrelated to that of countries where French banks might own assets, and second because the 
international merger and acquisitions of French banks took place only in the very recent years. 
Another more practical reason lies in that we can only observe the path of French GDP growth to 
perform stress tests and do not want to impend artificially on the effect of a recession on ROA 
(conservative assumption on stress tests, see section 4); 
  10-  The ‘inflation’ variable is defined as the year-on-year variation in the French consumer price 
index; 
-  The ‘yield curve’ variable is the difference between the 10-year French Treasury bond rate and 
the 3-month Euribor (Pibor before 1999) rate; 
-  The 'stock market index’s return’ (volatility) variable is measured as the year-on-year growth of 
the SBF250 index’ return (the annual historical volatility of the SBF250 index); 
-  The loan growth is the year-on-year relative change in the total credit volume in the French 
economy.  
 
Chart 2 shows the developments in some of the main macroeconomic variables (GDP growth the 
yield curve) used in our model.  
 
[Chart 2: evolution of GDP growth and yield curve (1993-2009)] 
 
Table 2 provides summary information on the definition of the variables we use in this paper and 
outlines their expected signs. Table 3 shows some descriptive statistics of the macroeconomic 
variables  
 
[Table 2: Expected signs of explanatory variables] 
 




Our objective is to identify the macroeconomic, financial and bank-specific determinant of 
banks’ profitability. For this purpose, as shown by Chart 2, bank profits seem to persist over time. 
Hence, following Berger et al. (2000), we allow for the existence of an autoregressive component 
of ROA. More specifically, we consider a dynamic model specification including a lagged 
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where π is ROA and c a constant, i indicates the i-th bank of the sample, X
j indicates the j-th 
macroeconomic variable which is common to all banks, Z
k indicates k-th bank-specific variable 
and   is a residual terme composed of a bank-specific fixed effect  t i i t i u ,   , + =ν ε i ν  and a normal 
residual  .  t i u ,
 
2.5 Econometric investigation 
 
Our econometric investigation is performed in four steps. As a first step, we test for the 
stationarity of the panel, using unit root tests for unbalanced panels (the Levin, Lin and Chu test, 
complemented by a Fisher test). Results are presented in Table 4 and tend to confirm the 
stationarity of the panel. 
 
[Table 4: results of the stationarity tests for the bank-specific variables] 
 
The stationarity of the macroeconomic variables is also tested using a Dickey Fuller test but is 
not that relevant given the small number of observations (17 for each variable). 
 
[Table 5: results of the stationarity tests for the macroeconomic and financial variables] 
 
As a second step, we identify whether some explanatory variables might be endogenous. There 
are two good candidates: apart from the credit risk measure, which will not be retained in the end 
because of its insignificance, the capital ratio and the share of non-interest income in total assets. 
Following Athanasoglou et al. (2008), we run model (1) with these variables as strictly 
exogenous, strictly endogenous or one exogenous and the other endogenous. The Sargan tests, 
though they indicate that both could be considered as endogenous, appear in favour of 
considering nnii i.e. the share of income coming from non-interest activities as endogenous and 
capital as exogenous. This may seem surprising as the equity ratio, as a target variable, is 
generally considered endogenous in most papers (Athanasoglou et al., 2008).  
 
  12A third question that may arise is the treatment of mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Following 
Athanasoglou et al. (2008) and Albertazzi and Gambacorta (2009), we chose to disregard any 
detailed treatment of mergers and acquisitions, and to estimate an unbalanced panel. There may 
be two reasons for this: first, including a dummy variable for each merger may limit dramatically 
the number of degrees of freedom of the system; second, as argued by Athanasoglou et al. (2008), 
the capital variable already accounts indirectly for potential M&A effects5. 
 
Fourth, as regards the estimation stricto sensu, we use the Arellano-Bond (Arellano and Bond, 
1991) two step estimator for dynamic panel-data models and robust option to report standard 
error. We use two types of instruments for our difference equation: all exogenous variables (X 
and Z) as additional standard instruments except non interest income (nnii)6 and lagged 
endogenous variables (π and nnii) as difference GMM-type instruments. The difference equation 















3.1 Baseline equation 
 
Our aim is to estimate the impact of economic and financial shocks on banks’ profitability. We 
begin by considering the whole vector of possible variables, identified in the literature, that is to 
say: GDP growth, spread, inflation rate, stock market return, stock market volatility, loan growth, 
share of non-interest income, capital, expenditures, risk and the constant.  
 
Firstly, we chose stock market index’s return as the measure of market activities. However, the 
coefficient of this variable proves not significant in our regressions, especially when estimated 
                                                      
5 To check for robustness, we re-run our regressions excluding observations corresponding to a yearly increase in assets by more 
than 20%. This leaves the results unchanged.  
6 Non interest income is directly linked with net income. By running several models, regression results show inherently that non 
interest income is better modelled as an endogenous variable.   
  13with other macroeconomic variables. Then, we find that the positive coefficients of the yield 
curve and the market index return are not simultaneously significant. Besides, this variable is 
highly and negatively correlated to inflation, with a correlation coefficient of -0.60 during the 
studied period (cf. Table 6). For that reason, in the remainder of the paper, we only consider stock 
market volatility as a proxy for market risk.  
 
[Table 6: coefficient of correlation between macroeconomic and financial variables] 
 
Regarding the other macroeconomic variables, we find that the inflation rate is not significant 
when combined with GDP growth. This may result from the strong relationship between these 
two variables. Loan growth is never significant and dropped from the remaining equations. 
Furthermore, among the banking specific variables, we find that the variables ‘risk’ and 
‘expenditures’ are not significant but keep the former in the remaining results to be consistent 
with the underlying theoretical models. 
 
Finally, we get the final results which are presented in Table 7, which are those we will consider 
in the remainder of the paper as the main equation results. 
 
[Tables 7: Results for the main equations] 
 
The significant coefficient on the lagged endogenous variable confirms the dynamic 
specification. The coefficient of the lagged ROA, which equals to 0.171, indicates that 
profitability seems to be moderately persistent over time. According to Athanasoglou et al. 
(2008), a small value of that coefficient means that the banking industry is fairly competitive 
(high speed of adjustment) or that informational opacity is low (Berger et al., 2000). 
 
The regression results confirm our guess that a higher GDP growth, steeper yield curve or higher 
inflation rate increase banks’ profitability. The coefficient on GDP growth means that an increase 
in GDP growth by 1% increases the overall ROA of the whole French banking system by about 
0.04%, which is quite important given the average ROA over the sample (0.67%). The same 
reasoning applies to the yield curve. Contrary to the market index return, market index volatility 
is negatively linked with banking profitability. An interpretation is that higher stock market 
  14volatility is associated with higher uncertainty, leading to lower profits. To test whether the 
relationship is still relevant when the economic growth slows down, we re-run the main equation 
with a cross-variable which equals the economic growth times a time dummy for periods when 
economic growth is lower than 2%. The results remain unchanged.  
 
As regards the effects of banking structure to banking global profitability, we observe that both 
the leverage ratio (the inverse of the capital-to-asset ratio included in our estimation) and the non-
interest income have a positive effect on banking profitability. The fact that the intensity in the 
use of capital increases banks’ profitability can be interpreted as a proxy for the “efficiency” of 
the capital, particularly important in banks’ risky businesses. Besides, we find evidence that small 
banks have higher ROA than other banks, consistently with descriptive statistics and the 
empirical literature. 
 
3.2 Back testing of the results 
 
In order to analyse the quality of our model, the following standard tests for linear dynamic panel 
models are presented in the result table of each regression: the Wald-test indicates jointly 
significance of coefficients of explanatory variables; the Sargan-test shows no evidence of over-
identifying restrictions; the negative statistic value for the first-order autocorrelation test on errors 
is expected in dynamic panel models; the second-order autocorrelation test on errors have been 
rejected so that there is no autocorrelation of order 2 of differenced errors.  
 
In addition, the following table 8 and chart 3 give additional information on the quality of the 
model. Table 8 shows that first and second moments of actual and estimated ROA plea for the 
robustness of the regression over the whole sample (2292 observations). Chart 3 shows that the 
model is able to replicate the broad dynamics of the actual path of the aggregate ROA. 
 
[Table 8: Results of back testing] 
 
[Chart 3: path of average ROA] 
 
3.3 Additional robustness checks 
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3.3.1 Baseline equation re-estimated with group-effects 
 
As shown in Table 1, the panel used may exhibit slight differences in the behaviour of sub-
samples of the panel. In this subsection, we re-estimate the main equation with specific effects 
linked to the legal status or to the size on the individuals.  
 
Individual effects linked to banks’ legal status 
 
We estimate a further regression for ROA where the variable GDP growth has been substituted 
by GDP growth times indicators ( ), which are dummy variables on banks’ legal status. The 
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q I : q-th dummy variable; for example, =1 for mutual and cooperative banks, 0 otherwise.  bmc I
 
The table 9 presents the results for this alternative estimation . 
 
Our main findings are that mutual and cooperative banks appear less impacted by GDP growth 
shocks than commercial banks, with a sensitivity of 0.01 against 0.052, which tends to prove that 
mutual banks’ profits are poorly impacted by the business cycle. 
 
[Table 9: Results for the equation with individual effects] 
 
Individual effects linked to banks’ balance-sheet size 
 
We differentiate banks’ size according to the size of their balance-sheet; banks that are in the 
75%-100% percentile region of the largest balance-sheet are classified as large banks, and banks 
in the bottom 25% percentile region are classified as small banks.  
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Our main finding is that small banks seem to be more affected than other banks by shocks on 
GDP growth. 
 
All in all, the results of the subsection 3.3.1 can be summarized in that we do not exhibit a clear 
homogeneity of the panel as regards the sensitivity of each category’s ROA to GDP growth. 
Nevertheless, as our goal is to study the resilience of the whole French banking system to adverse 
macroeconomic scenarios, we will consider only the results of the main equation in the remainder 
of the paper. 
 
3.3.2 Restricting the time-window 
 
As a complementary robustness check, we propose to re-run the main equation on a narrower 
time-window that would cover the period 2000-2009. A reason for choosing this restricted period 
lies in that some authors find a different behaviour of ROA’s reaction to macroeconomic 
variables after 1999 because of:  
-  the introduction of the euro;  
-  a different business model of banks; 
-  a growing influence of securitization, that would threaten the old model of profits through 
maturity transformation, and thus alter especially the sensitivity of ROA to spread 
fluctuations. 
 
In addition, despite the gap is in general small, Chart 3 shows that the model as estimated over 
the whole period systematically overestimates the actual ROA from 1994 to 1999, as it is the 
opposite in the remaining period. Results of the main model re-estimated over the 2000-2009 
sub-period presented in the last column of Table 9 clearly plea for the robustness of the model, as 
regards the magnitude of the coefficients, even if the significance of the coefficients is slightly 
altered. But for our stress testing purpose (section 4), only the magnitude of the various 
coefficients matters. In addition, re-drawing Chart 3 but with the coefficients re-estimated over 
the 2000-2009 sub-period leaves the gap between estimated and actual ROA unchanged (chart 
available upon request). 
 
  173.3.3  Orthogonalizing the macroeconomic variables 
 
As our three variables of interest (GDP growth, interest rate spread, stock market volatility) prove 
somewhat correlated (cf. Table 6), we re-estimate the main model after orthogonalization of those 
variables For this purpose, we keep our GDP growth variable unchanged. We regress the spread 
on the GDP growth and a constant term and define the orthogonalized spread* as the residuals of 
this equation. Moreover, we regress the volatility of the stock market on the GDP growth, the 
spread and a constant term and define the residuals of that equation as the new stock market 
volatility. We re-run all the equations above using those new variables. Results presented in 
Tables 10 and 11 show that, on the whole, our main results are robust. 
 
[Tables 10: Robustness tests: Results with orthogonalized macroeconomic variables] 
 
[Table 11: Robustness tests: Results with orthogonalized macroeconomic variables] 
 
3.3.4  Using an alternative measure of product diversification 
 
As our measure of product diversification ‘nnii’ is by construction an element of the ROA and 
might appear very specific to financial and investment firms (for which it exhibits the highest 
values), we estimate an alternative model which relies on another measure of product 
diversification, that is to say the ratio of loans to the total assets, as proxy for the loan activity of 
banks. When we re-run the Sargan test, we find that our new variable loans/assets has to be 
specified as an exogenous variable, whereas the ratio of capital now appears endogenous and is 
specified as such in the regression. Results presented in Table 12 are fully consistent with the 
main results of Table 7. 
 
[Table 12: Results with alternative measure of product diversification] 
 
 
4. Macroeconomic stress-tests of French banks’ profitability 
 
  18Stress-tests focused on banking profitability seek to identify the most important economic and 
financial channels of contagion of an initial shock that may affect the stability of the banking 
sector. Indeed, as the previous section showed, the economic and financial market environment 
may affect banks' profitability. The aim of stress test exercises is to study the effects of some 
macroeconomic or financial variables paths derived from various scenarios – a forecast and some 
adverse variants - on relevant banking variables, such as profitability. 
 
4.1 The stress testing framework 
 
The approaches by Lehmann and Manz (2006) and Rouabah (2006), focusing on Swiss and 
Luxemburg respectively, conclude that the impact of macroeconomic and financial shocks on 
banks' profits is relatively modest, showing that the two banking sectors are resilient. But the 
analysis carried out in these papers, albeit interesting, is limited to sensitivity analysis and does 
not consider the effect of a comprehensive adverse scenario on banking variables, especially 
profitability. 
 
Here, it is very important to notice that our aim is not to only study the impact of one shock of 
one specific explanatory variable on the income subcomponents, regardless of the impact of such 
a shock on the other variables. On the contrary, the impact of stress scenarios on the relevant risk 
factors is consistently determined with the Banque de France's (Baghli et al., 2005) forecast 
models (Mascotte and Nigem). This means that we simulate the effects of various exogenous 
shocks (in our stress test exercise, demand shocks yielding recession scenarios, a yield curve 
flattening and an exchange rate shock), conditionally on these models, on the “stressed” output 
variables of the macroeconomic model (that prove to be our “stressed” explanatory variables for 
the banking model), which are then used as “stressed” inputs in our revenue model. Hence, we 
get “stressed” profitability, which is compared to the value obtained without any stress (i.e. in 
line with the basis line of the forecast). The advantage of using such a macroeconomic model is 
that it offers a lot of flexibility in the design of the scenario and that it ensures the consistency of 
the forecasted and stressed paths of the various macroeconomic variables. 
 
A limitation to this approach lies in the feature of traditional macroeconometric models. Even 
though it provides an integrated and consistent framework to link the different effects of 
  19exogenous shocks on key macro variables such as GDP growth, loans or interest rates, the model 
is not clearly devoted to analyse financial relationships and how different agents in the system 
may be financially constrained. Hence, in such models, there is no limit to credit demand from 
households. Another limitation is related to the fact that our model does not aim at taking into 
account “second round” effects, as it only captures the effect of macroeconomic shocks on 
banking variables and not directly that of banking variables on macroeconomic and financial 
ones. In addition, our stress test exercises are carried out all other things being equal: in 
particular, we do not model any portfolio reallocation, leading to a shift from interest income to 
trading income, in case of, for instance, a negative shock on the spread, leading to a decrease of 
net interest revenues. For these reasons, it seems much more relevant to restrict our stress test 
exercise to the first year of shock, given that it is likely to avoid any unreliable result.  
 
4.2 Results of the stress test  
 
The macroeconomic baseline scenario stems from the Broad Macroeconomic Projection Exercise 
for France, which is produced by the DG Economics of the Banque de France. Stressed scenarios 
are defined as severe but plausible in comparison with the baseline scenario. At the juncture of 
April 2009, we designed and tested five hypothetical stress scenarios which were all found at that 
time consistent with the definition of stress test scenarios (severe but plausible) though their 
probability of occurence is from a statistical and historical point of view likely different. At that 
point, it is indeed important to understand that the design of stress scenarios strongly rely on 
expert judgement. Conversely, it should be very clear at that point that our goal is not to compare 
quantitatively the magnitude of the effects of each adverse scenario with respect to the others. We 
are much more interested in i) the qualitative comparison of different outputs of various 
scenarios; ii) the absolute magnitude of the effects of scenarios over a certain threshold, for 
instance a negative profitability of banks. Hence, the five scenarios that were worth simulating 
were as follows: 
-  Internal demand shocks: - 1% GDP growth, - 2% GDP growth, - 3% GDP growth; 
-  Financial shocks: a 25% depreciation of the dollar against the euro; a flattening of the yield curve 
(- 200 bp Euribor 3-month and – 400 bp OAT (government bonds)10-year). 
 
[Table 13: design of scenarios] 
  20 
As the question of whether the recession shocks tested, though they appear ‘severe’ enough, are 
plausible, we study the distribution of GDP growth in France from 1875 to 2008 excluded the 
war years in order to calibrate the probability of recession (cf. chart 4). It is clear from the results 
of non autocorrelation tests (cf. table 14) that the GDP growth is a White Noise process. 
Moreover, the GDP growth does not follow a Normal distribution according to the normality 
tests (cf. table 15). Thanks to the distribution of GDP growth, we simulate the probability of the 
three recession scenarios defined previously. According to this distribution, the average value of 
GDP growth is 2.7% and the cumulative probability associated is about 58%. Hence, the 
probability that the GDP growth is greater than the average value is equal to 42%. We get that the 
probability of GDP growth to be smaller than -1% is 14%, 2% is 8% and -3% is 5% (cf. Table 
16). 
 
[Table 14: White Noise test for GDP growth] 
 
[Table 15: Normality test] 
 
[Table 16: Calculation of expected ROA] 
 
As earlier said, the impacts of the stress scenarios on the relevant macro risk factors (GDP, loan 
growth, interest rates) for the years 2009-2010 are determined by using the Banque de France 
Mascotte model (Baghli et al., 2005) and NIGEM, the latter being provided by the NIESR 
(National Institute of Economic and Social Research) and used to introduce international 
interactions.  
 
Table 13 presents the effects of these scenarios on the variables used as inputs in our profitability 
models. Table 14 presents the results of stress tests using the baseline model presented in table 7. 
 
[Table 17: results of stress tests using the baseline model] 
 
  21First, our results show that the French banking system would be somewhat resilient to the set of 
comprehensive adverse scenarios tested. Only the severe recession scenarios (-2% growth and -
3% growth) would generate negative profits. On the contrary, other scenarios (flattening of the 
yield curve, exchange rate shock, moderate recession) would yield positive profits. In comparison 
with the actual figures for the French banking system recorded in 2009, those results stemming 
from the stress test scenarios are consistent with the reporting of banks. Indeed, as the GDP 
growth forecast for 2009 is likely to be in the range [-2.4%;-2%] (see for instance recent OECD’s 
and IMF’s outlooks), our -2% stress scenario constitutes a good benchmark. The annual ROA of 
-0.01% forecasted by the model is not that far from the actual figure, which equals 0.02% for the 
French banking industry in aggregated consolidated data. This means that the diagnosis of 
relatively good results recorded by the French banking system in the context of the current crisis 
could have been rather accurately forecasted by the model, especially relatively to the mean of 
ROA over the sample (0.67%). This reveals  the robustness of our model as a backtesting check. 
In addition, the first actual figure obtained for French banks’ ROA, 0.063%, is close to that 
obtained by simulating our model using the actual path for explanatory variables, providing, 
again, grounds to the robustness of our model. 
 
In order to answer the question of why French banks and the French banking system as a whole 
prove that resistant to strong economic shocks, an alternative would be to go in deeper details in 
the analysis of income subcomponents (e.g. Coffinet et al., 2009) and is left for future research. 
Nevertheless, the interpretation of main equation’s results can provide some intuition. Indeed, 
one of the three main macroeconomic drivers – the interest rate maturity spread – is clearly 
linked to the traditional maturity transformation activity of banks. Conversely, the GDP growth 
could be associated to that income subcomponent as stronger economic growth could enhance the 
credit demand and hence support the loan activity and profitability of banks. Another significant 
driver of overall banks’ profitability – stock market volatility – is clearly specific to trading 
revenues (and indirectly GDP growth). As a result, a conclusion that can be drawn from these 
results is that the French model of universal banking –that is to say the diversification of products 
and revenues by banks – could lead to opposite developments in income subcomponents in 
depressed situations, the higher risk and lower profits generated by trading activities and 
economic downturn being compensated by a more profitable traditional credit activity, driven by 
a widening of the yield curve in downturns – e.g. due to interest rate cuts by the central bank. 
  22That can also be due to the fact that the provision of services, commission and fee, trading might 
suddenly stop which is not the case of traditional intermediation activities which generate interest 
in the long run. Therefore, our results can be viewed as a support for the model of universal 





Our results provide evidence of statistically significant relationships between the macro 
environment and the profitability of the banking industry. In particular, we provide strong 
evidence that the overall French banking system’s profitability positively depends on the French 
GDP growth, the stock market return and the interest rate maturity spread, the share of non-
interest income and the capital owned by banks, and negatively on bank size and credit risk. 
These results are consistent with those obtained in the banking literature. 
 
Our stress testing analysis suggests that the impact of economic shocks may be relatively modest 
in terms of profitability, the French banking system being quite resilient and well capitalized to 
absorb extreme macroeconomic and financial variations. In particular, the model would have 
performed in a good manner to forecast the good results of the French banks in spite of the 
current depressed environment. These results can be interpreted as a plea for the model of 
universal banking, though further work should be carried out to definitely conclude on that point. 
 
However, a lot of work remains to be done, as other risk channels may affect banks’ profits but 
are not simulated in our framework, such as the sudden illiquidity in specific banking activities 
observed in August 2007 at the beginning of the subprime crisis (illiquid structured products, 
tensions in the money market...). Moreover, the model may be refined in terms of econometrics, 
as it fails to explicitly account for non-linearities that may arise in extreme events. Since we are 
especially interested in the extreme losses arising from stressed scenarios, it would be of 
particular interest to implement quantile regressions.  
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ROA  1       
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ROE  0,93  -0,59  1 
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Average  0,7%  0,5%  0,6% 0,9% 0,4%  0,7% 0,9%
Std.  0,7%  0,7%  0,3% 1,0% 0,4%  0,7% 1,0%
Min  -1,6%  -1,6%  -0,7% -1,5% -1,5%  -1,6% -1,6%
Max  4,1%  4,1%  3,2% 4,1% 3,0%  4,1% 4,1%
Obs.  2896  920  1070 906 724  1448 724
Capital / assets 
Average  10%  8%  8% 14% 6%  9% 17%
Std.  12%  13%  4% 15% 4%  7% 19%
Min  -3%  0%  -3% 0% 0%  -3% 0%
Max  100%  100%  31% 97% 23%  81% 100%
Non interest income /assets 
Average  3%  2%  2% 4% 1%  2% 5%
Std.  9%  4%  1% 15% 1%  3% 16%
Min  -16%  -16%  0% -3% 0%  -16% -3%
Max  210%  33%  7% 210% 7%  68% 210%
expenditures / assets 
Average  3%  3%  2% 5% 2%  3% 6%
Std.  8%  3%  1% 14% 1%  2% 15%
Min  0%  0%  0% 0% 0%  0% 0%
Max  195%  30%  6% 195% 6%  59% 195%
Individual net operating income /total operating income 
Average  0,6%  1,1%  0,4% 0,2% 2%  0,2% 0,0%
Std.  1,9%  3,1%  1,1% 0,8% 4%  0,1% 0,0%
Min  0%  0%  0% 0% 0%  -0,2% 0,0%
Max  23%  23%  11% 12% 23%  1,3% 0,4%
Loans / assets 
Average  74%  72%  84% 66% 73%  77% 72%
Std.  24%  21%  9% 32% 16%  23% 29%
Min  0%  4%  40% 0% 3%  0% 0%
Max  100%  99%  96% 100% 98%  99% 100%
Loan loss provisions / loans 
Average  3%  3%  1% 5% 1%  2% 7%
Std.  10%  12%  5% 12% 2%  8% 16%
Min  0%  0%  0% 0% 0%  0% 0%
Max  100%  100%  96% 99% 21%  99% 100%
Ln(Assets) 
Average  15  15  16 14 17.5  15 12
Std.  2  2  1.1 2.1 1.3  0.7 0.9
  32Min  7  10  12 7 16  14 7
Max  22  22  21 21 22  16 14
Subsample ROA<0 
Ln(Assets) 
Average  14     
Std.  2     
Capital / assets 
Average  0.11     
Std.  0.17     
Subsample ROA>0 
Ln(Assets) 
Average  15     
Std.  2     
Capital / assets 
Average  0.10     
Std.  0.11     
  33Table 2: Expected signs of explanatory variables 
 
Variable  Specifications  Notation Exp. Sign 
Dependent variable          
Profitability  Net profits after taxes / assets  ROA    
explanatory variables          
Output  GDP annual growth  GDP  + 
Inflation  Annual inflation rate  Cpi  +/- 
Loan  Annual growth rate of aggregated loans   Loan  + 
Yield curve  Difference between OAT10y and Euribor 3m  Spread  + 
Financial market 
return  SBF 250 index's annual return  Sbf  + 
Financial market 
volatility  Volatility of the SBF 250 index's annual return  Volsbf  - 
Large banks  Dummy variable for  large banks  Large  - 
Small banks  Dummy variable for  small banks  Small  + 
Capital  Capital over assets  Capital  + 
Credit risk  Loan loss provisions / loans  Risk  - 
Market power  Individual net operating income / total net operating 
income of the banking industry  P_Noi  + 
Non interest income  Non interest income / total assets  NNII  + 
 
  34Table 3: Macroeconomic and banking annual data (1993-2009) 
 
 
Macroeconomic data (1993-2009) 
  Average CV Min Max 
GDP growth  1.68% 0.93 -2.29% 4.08% 
Spread  0.93% 1.16 -1.82% 2.37% 
Loans  4.55% 0.91 -1.27% 11.75% 
Inflation  1.6% 0.41 0.09% 2.81% 
SBF250 return  8.2% 2.96 -41.61% 49.5% 
SBF250 volatility  18.7% 0.41 9.62% 38.3% 
  35Table 4: results of the stationarity tests for the bank-specific variables 
 
   Levin, Lin & chu  Fisher test 
Variable  W-stat  p-stat  χ²  p-stat 
ROA  -13 0.00 448 0.00 
Capital  -167 0.00 487 0.00 
Risk  -593 0.00 690 0.00 
NNII  -19 0.00 494 0.00 
  36  37
Table 5: results of the stationarity tests for the macroeconomic and financial variables 
 
Variables  Dickey-Fuller ERS 
   T-stat 
1% critical 
value  10% critical value 
GDP growth  -1.21  -2.73  -1.60 
Spread  -1.81  -2.73  -1.60 
Loan growth  -1.39  -2.73  -1.60 
Inflation  -1.82  -2.73  -1.60 
SBF return  -3.22  -2.73  -1.60 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































8Tables 7: Results for the main equations 
 
 
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel data estimation (t= 1993 - 2009) 
Number of Obs. = 2292 
Number of groups = 370 
ROA  coef.  p  coef.  p  coef.  p 
Lag1 (Roa)  0.171**  0.034  0.173**  0.035  0.171**  0.041 
GDP growth  0.039***  0.001  0.043***  0.000  0.041***  0.000 
CPI  -0.015  0.334             
Spread  0.047***  0.002  0.057***  0.000  0.056***  0.000 
L1. SBF volatility  -0.00004**  0.044  -0.00003*  0.064  -0.00004*  0.058 
Small  0.002  0.182             
Large  -0.001*  0.084             
Capital  0.013***  0.003  0.013***  0.003  0.013***  0.003 
NNII  0.065**  0.019  0.065**  0.020  0.065**  0.020 
Risk  -0.002  0.311             
Market power  0.031  0.617             
Low-growth* GDP              -0.002  0.849 
Wald test  chi2(11)=74 
p>chi2 = 
0.00  chi2(6)=51 
p>chi2 = 
0.00  chi2(7)=64 
p>chi2 = 
0.00 














Autocorrelation test AR(1)  z=-3.02  p>z=0.00  z=-3.02  p>z=0.00  z=-3.01  p>z=0.00 
Autocorrelation test AR(2)  z=0.26  p>z=0.80  z=0.24  p>z=0.81  z=0.24  p>z=0.81 
Overall R²  45%  39%  38% 
Between R²  61%  52%  51% 
Within R²  18%  17%  16% 
 
 
  39Table 8: Results of back testing 
 
Variable  obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
ROA  2291  0.66%  0.65%  -1.58%  4.06% 
estimated ROA  2291  0.63%  0.44%  -0.63%  9.69% 
 
  40Table 9: Results for the equations with individual effects  
 
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel data estimation  
(t= 1993 - 2009)             
(t= 2000 - 
2009)    
Number of Obs. = 2292  Number of Obs. = 1358 
Number of groups = 370  Number of groups =246 
ROA  coef.  p  coef.  p  coef.  p 
Lag1 (L.Roa)  0.169**  0.021  0.176**  0.015  0.120*  0.075 
GDP growth              0.035**  0.021 
Spread  0.066***  0.000  0.060***  0.000  0.082***  0.000 
L1. SBF volatility  -0.00005*** 0.008  -0.00004**  0.043  -0.00007***  0.002 
Capital  0.013***  0.002  0.013***  0.002  0.012***  0.005 
NNII  0.066**  0.024  0.066**  0.026  0.061**  0.024 
Bank*GDP  0.052***  0.010             
Cm*GDP  0.010  0.318             
IF*GDP  0.104***  0.000             
Large*GDP        0.034**  0.014       
Average*GDP        0.037***  0.006       
Small*GDP        0.087**  0.024       
Wald test  chi2(8)=58 
p>chi2 = 
0.00  chi2(8)=59 
p>chi2 = 
0.00  chi2(6)=64 
p>chi2 = 
0.00 














Autocorrelation test AR(1)  z=-3.10 
p>z=0.0
0  z=-3.08 
p>z=0.0
0  z=-3.35 
p>z=0.0
0 
Autocorrelation test AR(2)  z=0.26 
p>z=0.8
0  z=0.26 
p>z=0.8
0  z=-0.68 
p>z=0.4
9 
Overall R²  44%  43%  32% 
Between R²  58%  57%  42% 
Within  R²  19% 18% 14% 
 




Arellano-Bond dynamic panel data estimation (t= 1993 - 2009) 
Number of Obs. = 2292 
Number of groups = 370 
ROA  coef.  p  coef.  p  coef.  p 
Lag1 (Roa)  0.174**  0.012  0.173***  0.035  0.173**  0.037 
GDP growth  0.051***  0.000  0.055***  0.000  0.054***  0.000 
CPI  -0.016  0.322             
Spread*  0.035**  0.028  0.045***  0.002  0.044***  0.004 
L1. SBF volatility*  -0.004*  0.054  -0.003*  0.070  -0.004*  0.059 
Small  0.002  0.148             
Large  -0.001*  0.082             
Capital  0.013***  0.003  0.013***  0.003  0.013***  0.003 
NNII  0.066**  0.022  0.066**  0.022  0.066**  0.022 
Risk  0.031  0.557             
Market power  -0.002  0.21             
Recession-year* GDP              -0.005  0.726 
Wald test  chi2(11)=78 
p>chi2 = 
0.00  chi2(6)=51 
p>chi2 = 
0.00  chi2(7)=64 
p>chi2 = 
0.00 
Sargan test of over-







Autocorrelation test AR(1)  z=-3.02  p>z=0.00  z=-3.02  p>z=0.00  z=-3.01  p>z=0.00 
Autocorrelation test AR(2)  z=0.26  p>z=0.80  z=0.24  p>z=0.81  z=0.24  p>z=0.81 
Overall R²  46%  40%  36% 
Between R²  62%  48%  47% 
Within R²  19%  24%  18% 
 
  42Table 11: Robustness tests: Results with orthogonalized macroeconomic variables 
 
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel data estimation  
(t= 1993 - 2009)              (t= 2000 - 2009)   
Number of Obs. = 2292  Number of Obs. = 1358 
Number of groups = 370  Number of groups =246 
ROA  coef.  p  coef.  p  coef.  p 
Lag1 (L.Roa)  0.168**  0.021  0.176**  0.031  0.117*  0.075 
GDP growth              0.059***  0.000 
Spread*  0.051***  0.000  0.047***  0.002  0.060***  0.000 
L1. SBF volatility*  -0.005**  0.014  -0.004**  0.043  -0.007**  0.026 
Capital  0.013***  0.002  0.013***  0.002  0.012***  0.006 
NNII  0.066**  0.026  0.067**  0.024  0.061**  0.028 
Bank*GDP  0.067***  0.001             
Cm*GDP  0.029***  0.005             
IF*GDP  0.117***  0.000             
Large*GDP        0.049***  0.000       
Average*GDP        0.051***  0.000       
Small*GDP        0.099**  0.011       
Wald test  chi2(8)=58 
p>chi2 = 
0.00  chi2(8)=69 
p>chi2 = 
0.00  chi2(6)=64 
p>chi2 = 
0.00 
Sargan test of over-identifying 




0.74  chi2(208)=193 
p>chi2 = 
0.68 
Autocorrelation test AR(1)  z=-3.10  p>z=0.00  z=-3.08  p>z=0.00  z=-3.35  p>z=0.00 
Autocorrelation test AR(2)  z=0.26  p>z=0.80  z=0.25  p>z=0.80  z=-0.71  p>z=0.48 
 
 
  43Table 12: Results with alternative measure of product diversification  
 
ROA  coef.  p 
Lag1 (Roa)  0,101  0,132 
GDP growth  0,039***  0,000 
CPI  -0,022  0,175 
Spread  0,047***  0,002 
L1. SBF volatility  -0,00006***  0,002 
Small  0,004***  0,002 
Large  -0,001  0,144 
Capital  0,014**  0,017 
Loans  0,000  0,847 
Risk  0,000  0,845 
Market power  0,025  0,569 
Wald test  chi2(11)=80  p>chi2 = 0,00 
Sargan test of over-identifying inst.  chi2(238)=239 p>chi2 = 0,46 
Autocorrelation test AR(1)  z=-3,03  p>z=0,00 
Autocorrelation test AR(2)  z=0,24  p>z=0,81 
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Table 13: design of scenarios 
 
In deviation from the basis line 
GDP growth 
T+1 T+2 
1  - 1% GDP growth  -0.8  -2.1 
2  - 2% GDP growth  -2.1  -3.0 
3  - 3% GDP growth  -2.7  -4.0 
4  - 25% depreciation of USD/EUR   -0.6  0.0 
5  Flattening of the yield curve  0.0  0.4 
 Table 14: White Noise test for GDP growth 
 
Autocorrelation check for White Noise 
To lag  Chi-square  DF Pr>Khi 2 
6 9.65 6 0.14
12 10.85 12 0.55
18 19.12 18 0.39
24 26.33 24 0.34




  46Table 15: Normality test 
 
Normality tests 
Test  Statistique  p value 
Shapiro-Wilk  W= 0.96  Pr > W=0.001 
Kolmogorov-









growth  Prob.  GDP growth  Prob.  St prob.  ROA (N+1)  ST ROA 
> 2.7%  42%                
>-0.3%  80%  >-0.3%  80% 42% >0.07%  0.07%
>-1%  86%  [-1%, -0.3% [  6% 6% [0.04%, 0.07% [  0.04%
>-2%  92%  [-2%, -1% [  6% 6% [-0.01%, 0.04% [  -0.01%
>-3%  95%  [-2%, -3% [  3% 3% [-0.03%, -0.01% [  -0.03%
Average           0.030%
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Flattening of the 
yield curve (-200bp 
ST, -400bp LT) 
Aggeregated 
data 
T+1  0.04%  -0.01% -0.03% 0.05%  0.07%
T+2  0.01%  -0.03% -0.07% 0.10%  0.11%
Cooperative 
banks 
T+1  0.09%  0.08% 0.08% 0.10%  0.10%
T+2  0.07%  0.06% 0.05% 0.09%  0.09%
Commercial 
banks 
T+1  0.05%  -0.01% -0.04% 0.06%  0.09%
T+2  0.03%  -0.03% -0.08% 0.14%  0.16%
Financial firms 
T+1  0.00%  -0.13% -0.19% 0.02%  0.08%
T+2  -0.03%  -0.14% -0.25% 0.19%  0.23%
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